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O gerrymandering é uma prática comum que prevalece na política. Surgiu nos 
Estados Unidos da América, mas está, atualmente, bastante difundida. A 
presente dissertação pretende clarificar se estratégias do tipo do gerrymandering 
são uma realidade em Portugal, dado estas ocorrerem com frequência aquando 
reformas territoriais.  
Refletindo no ano de 2013, realizou-se uma importante reorganização 
administrativa do território das freguesias (RAFT) em Portugal, que levou a 
alterações na composição das freguesias, o que, por sua vez, levou a alterações 
no número de eleitores por freguesia. Portanto, foi esta reforma realizada com o 
intuito de melhorar a eficiência, reduzindo os custos para o país e 
consequentemente para a União Europeia (UE), ou foi, na verdade, um esquema 
político ordenado antecipadamente para favorecer certo(s) partido(s). Terá o 
processo de reorganização territorial sido realizado com uma estratégia de 
gerrymandering? 
O distrito do Porto, os seus municípios e as respetivas freguesias foram 
escolhidos para analisar a existência de enviesamento político, de enviesamento 
partidário e de gerrymandering. Usando as eleições autárquicas de 2009, 2013 e 
2017, e comparando-as através de uma análise de dados e de uma regressão 
linear, concluímos que o enviesamento partidário existe e é significativo no 
distrito do Porto. Podemos também afirmar que o gerrymandering ocorreu na 
sequência do aumento do enviesamento partidário no sentido do partido do 
governo, tendo este sido beneficiado nas eleições autárquicas de um terço dos 
municípios pertencentes ao distrito do Porto, em consequência da aplicação da 
RAFT em 2013.  
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Gerrymandering is a common practice that prevails in politics. Emerged in the 
United States of America, it is now widespread. The present dissertation intents 
to clarify whether gerrymandering alike strategies are a reality in Portugal as 
they are frequent when there is a territory reform. 
Reflecting at the year 2013, there was a major reorganization of the territory of 
the parishes in Portugal (RAFT) which led to changes in the parishes’ 
composition, which, in turn, let to changes in the number of voters per parish. 
So, was RAFT a way to improve efficiency, reducing costs for the country and 
therefore for the European Union (EU), or was it, in fact, just a preordain political 
scheme to favour some party(ies). Was the process of territorial reorganization 
carried out with a gerrymandering strategy? 
Porto’s district, its counties and respective parishes were chosen for the 
analysis of political bias, partisan bias and gerrymandering. Using the local 
elections of 2009, 2013 and 2017, and comparing them through a data analysis 
and a linear regression, we were able to conclude that partisan bias exists and is 
significant in Porto’s district. We can also say that gerrymandering occurred as a 
result of the increase in the partisan bias towards the government party, which 
benefited in the municipal elections of one third of the counties belonging to the 
district of Porto, as a result of the application of RAFT in 2013.  
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Economics and Politics are crucial themes in the actual society and are reliant 
on one another. So, it seems right to study the relationship cause-effect between 
them, that is, the effects each provoke on the other. Therefore, this dissertation 
aims to understand an apparent causality relation amongst an administrative 
territory reform (economic view) and a reallocation of voters (political view). The 
focus of both economic and politics studies is not typical in Portugal, as it does 
not constitute one of the richest nor poorest countries in the world. As Portugal 
seems neglected internationally speaking, this creates a gap that this thesis 
proposes to bridge in part. 
 
While most of the literature emphasizes on the effects of gerrymandering 
(which often arises from territory reforms) or the ways of avoiding it, this 
dissertation aims to verify if this method was executed in the Portuguese 
territory. Many researchers study this political strategy (gerrymandering) and its 
effects on the economy, however, those studies do not focus in Portugal and 
much less in Porto’s district. Seizing this research gap and bearing in mind the 
words of Toni Morrison “If there's a book that you want to read, but it hasn't been 
written yet, then you must write it.”, I decided to follow this breach and write 
this dissertation. 
 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to understand the extent to which 
gerrymandering was a reality in Portugal, considering the before and after the 
2013 administrative reorganization of the territory of the parishes (RAFT). Was 
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the administrative reorganization of the territory of the parishes in Portugal 
conducted in order to obtain advantage regarding certain parties? Was the 
administrative reorganization of the territory of the parishes in Portugal an 
occasion where certain parties used gerrymandering alike strategies? Was 
partisan bias a reality in the local elections of 2013?  
 
In the well-known words of Charles Kettering “a problem well stated is a 
problem half-solved”. So, in order to answer to the research questions, it is 
necessary firstly to understand what gerrymandering, political bias and partisan 
bias refer to through a literature review (Chapter 1). It is also important to 
enlighten about how the electoral process is conducted in Portugal. Then, it is 
critical to acquaint the objectives, principles and alterations triggered by RAFT, 
qualitatively (Chapter 2).  
 
A database with voting information regarding Porto’s district, and more 
important its parishes by county, was constructed in order to understand 
whether partisan bias and gerrymandering were held in Portugal, quantitively, 
achieving the proposed objectives and answering the research questions. 
Afterwards, the electoral data that remotes to the elections of 2009, 2013 and 2017, 
was used to compare the proportions of votes a party had globally and the 
proportion of parish councils that the same party won, and to conclude whether 
gerrymandering was a reality in Porto´s district (Chapter 3).  
 
Resorting to the potentialities of the statistical software STATA, it was defined 
a linear regression that allow the analysis of the partisan bias and also outline 
gerrymandering strategies (Chapter 4). In the end, using the information 
obtained both in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we were able to provide some answers 
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to the research questions, to find some limitations of the study (Chapter 5), and 
to suggest different paths for further researches (Conclusion). 
 
The results give us a positive response to the research questions: partisan bias 
is a reality in Portugal not only in 2013 but also in 2009 and 2017; and RAFT 
resulted in an escalation of that phenomenon. Therefore, it seems that RAFT used 
a gerrymandering strategy to favour the government, as the party in the 








1. Events on the political-economic atmosphere 
This chapter intends to provide an organized overview and explanation of the 
most relevant terms related with our research question like political bias, partisan 
bias and gerrymandering.  
 
1.1 Political and Partisan Bias 
1.1.1 Definition of political and partisan bias 
 
According to the  Cambridge Dictionary, bias is “the action of supporting or 
opposing a particular person or thing in an unfair way, because of allowing 
personal opinions to influence your judgement”. Bias usually causes a sense of 
injustice by favouring or hindering one person, group or thing compared with 
another. 
 
Bias may occur in different settings. When it occurs in politics, it is called 
political bias or partisan bias. Even though these two can be seen as analogous, 
and even partisan bias as a subgroup of political bias, actually they present 
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different denotations. While political bias is “the distance between the policy 
preferred by the median voter and the policy that actually emerges from the 
legislature” (Gillian & Matsusaka, 2006, p. 396), partisan bias “refers to an 
asymmetry in the way party vote share is translated into seats, that is, a situation 
where some parties are able to win a given share of seats with a lesser (share of 
the) votes than is true for other parties” (Grofman, Koetzle, & Brunell, 1997 p. 
457), that may lead to a steady degradation of the electoral influence of a party 
group (Issacharoff, 2002). 
 
Magar, Trelles, Altman, and McDonald (2017) in turn, state that one is in the 
presence of partisan bias when there is “undue advantage conferred to some 
party in the conversion of votes into legislative seats”. This constitutes exactly 
the underpinning subject-matter analysed in Porto’s district case (Chapter 3). 
 
Moreover, Magar et al. (2017) in their study of the components of partisan bias 
applied to Mexico, state that the conversion of votes into seats (votes-seats 
curves) usually follows two technical features: responsiveness, which measures 
the difference in seats regarding the number of votes (the slope of votes-seats 
curves), being considered a symmetric distortion of the votes-seats curves in two 
party systems as one party wins seats at the costs of the other; and partisan bias, 
a characteristic where a party is able to win seats with fewer votes than the 
opposition due to a systematic bias, being thus an asymmetric distortion in the 
votes-seats relation. Likewise, for Sauger and Grofman (2016), partisan bias is “a 
measure of the degree of (hypothetical) symmetry of treatment of the votes share 
of different parties or party blocs as they are reflected in seat shares”.  
 
It is important to retain that “A party with 20% of the vote that is evenly spread 
nationwide across districts may fail to win a single seat; while another, 
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geographically concentrated, party may win multiple seats with much less 
support” (Magar et al., 2017, p. 3). This means that the distribution of the voters 
can lead to partisan bias and that the different concentration of the voters across 
regions/districts exerts a big influence on the vote-share/seat-share conversion 
nationally. 
 
This asymmetry leads to a situation where “A party favoured by systematic 
bias wins seats with fewer votes than their opposition, which can lead to counter 
majoritarian outcomes when the party winning the most votes fails to win a 
legislative majority” (Magar et al., 2017, p. 2). In other words, a party with less 
share of the votes can win a majority of seats in the parliament, because of the 
already existing bias and vice versa.  
 
To summarise, partisan bias is an important driver of voting behaviour and 
not a mere product subsequent from experimentations (Robbett & Matthews, 
2018).  
 
A low level of partisan bias and electoral volatility is recommended in order 
to reach efficiency (Helland & Sørensen, 2015). Therefore, a country that presents 
a low level of partisan bias is going to be able to reveal the true personal 
preferences of its citizens. 
 
1.1.2 Sources of partisan bias 
 
All districted systems are, in theory, exposed to partisan biases (Grofman et 
al., 1997) thus, it becomes clear that the act of redistricting may have underneath 
the intention of creating a bias, increasing an existent bias or decreasing an 
 25 
existent bias in the opposite way. This also reveals that the geographic 
distribution of party vote share (also known as partisan gerrymandering – see 
sections 1.2 and 1.3) is one of the causes of partisan bias.  
 
Grofman et al. (1997)  show that other causes of partisan bias are differences 
in turnout rates and in population across districts/regions (malapportionment) 
but state that both these two causes per se do not induce partisan bias, and that it 
only happens when these causes are connected with the distribution of party 
voting strength. Magar et al. (2017) argue that malapportionment is linked to 
human choices but that it is not clear if the same happens with turnout 
differences across districts or geographic distribution of party votes shares. For 
them, the turnout has obvious endogenous components and the geographic 
distribution distortion could be caused by features due to geographical 
specificities and not by intended partisan gerrymandering. 
 
Despite some differences in their studies regarding the estimation of the 
components of partisan bias, both Grofman et al. (1997) and Magar et al. (2017) 
consider that the main components of partisan bias are malapportionment, 
difference in turnout across districts and geographic distribution of partisan 
support. 
 
Regardless of having three main sources, the influence each one confers may 
differ in the process of partisan bias. Magar et al. (2017) indicate that “partisan 
bias sources may vary in importance and, to a fair extent, may run counter to or 
amplify each other”. In their analysis, Magar et al. (2017) demonstrate that 
mitigating one of the causes of bias (by compensations) could involuntarily 
generate an increase in the global bias.  
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 Although all sources are important to understand the context of the overall 
bias, partisan gerrymandering is the one on which most studies lean, and, 
similarly, where this dissertation will focus. 
 
1.1.3 Analytical calculation of partisan bias 
 
The mere theoretical framework is not enough to understand the depth of 
partisan bias. More important than understanding the theory is comprehending 
how partisan bias is analytically calculated.  
 
Despite presenting a research that is not directly focused on partisan bias (but 
instead on policy bias), Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) reformulated their model 
to show how partisan bias could be calculated.  
 
Considering that there are only two parties competing, party 0 and party 1, 
𝑥𝑖 ∈  {0,1} represents the voters i’s party preferences. This way, the voters who 





𝑖=1   and the ones who prefer party 
0 are represented by 𝑉0 = 1 −  𝑉1 . Analogously, 𝑥𝑘
∗ ∈  {0,1} is representing the 
party correspondent to the legislature’s representative. So, the seats each party 





𝑘=1   and 𝐿0 = 1 −  𝐿1 . Partisan 
bias is 𝛽 =  𝐿1 −  𝑉1 , i.e., the difference in the seats a party obtained (L) and the 
votes it received (V) (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2006). 
These calculations would be enough to draw conclusions to the case study of 
Porto’s district if Portugal had only two competing parties, however, this is not 
the case. So, in this thesis, a new version of the problem will be defined to cover 
these particularities, which is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 27 
1.2 Gerrymandering 
1.2.1 Definition of gerrymandering 
 
In accordance with the Cambridge Dictionary, gerrymandering corresponds 
to “an occasion when someone in authority changes the borders of an area in 
order to increase the number of people within that area who will vote for a 
particular party or person”. In other words, gerrymandering is a strategy that 
aims to favouriting a certain party in the elections. This strategy, correlated with 
taking political advantage, is usually conducted when one is in the presence of a 
reorganization of the voters/citizens, i.e., in the presence of a territory reform (act 
of redistricting). 
 
Although gerrymandering is more of a problem as the population grows 
(Gillian & Matsusaka, 2006, p. 386), it can also be one of the secondary effects of 
these type of reforms in the territory organization (Ruley, 2017). 
 
Even though most of the literature mentions examples of strategies such as 
gerrymandering and political bias occurring specially in the United States of 
America (USA), we can relate it to other countries such as Portugal.  
 
Gerrymandering began to emerge in the USA when the Voting Right Act 
(VRA) of 1965 prohibited racial discrimination in voting. From this date on, every 
vote was equally weighted, so, the citizens whose votes lost power and influence, 
had to find other ways to undermine the votes of the minorities, especially the 
votes of the black citizens. Racial gerrymandering was the solution found. By 
aggregating all the black citizens and other minority groups in one region, they 
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were able to minimize their representation and influence in the elections, 
undermining the people’s choice/will.  
 
The 1965 VRA revolution “sought to eliminate practices that deprived 
members of racial and language minority groups of their basic electoral rights” 
(Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2006, p. 392) but new forms of “wasting” these minority 
groups votes emerged and racial discrimination prevailed in America (Weeden, 
2019) through bolder ways such as the practice of gerrymandering. 
 
Portugal follows a democratic rule of law (Estado de Direito Democrático), 
which presupposes, according to article 48 of the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic “(…) the right to take part in the political life and direction of the 
country's public affairs, directly or through freely elected representatives”. 
Furthermore, “elections in a democratic order should permit the selection of “the 
free and uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take part in that 
choice”” (Issacharoff, 2002, p. 605). However, in politics there are ways to 
circumvent the rules, take advantage and harm people with different opinions 
for example by applying gerrymandering alike strategies.  
 
1.2.2 The harm triggered by gerrymandering 
 
The outcomes in policy in a democratic country depend on rules that include, 
among others, how voters are clustered into districts (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 
2006). It is for that reason, that Ruley (2017) considers gerrymandering one of the 
biggest abuses respecting voting rights. 
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The ills of gerrymandering are numerous, but it is mainly considered a 
problem because it translates to a sensation of non-fairness to the citizens. This 
leads to a situation where voters start to disenroll in the political atmosphere,  
“(…) if voters do not believe our democracy is working fairly, they will not 
participate” (Lowenthal, 2019, p. 2). Or as Robbett and Matthews (2018) put it, 
“Voters who believe that they are unlikely to be pivotal in deciding the outcome 
have little incentive to gather information in advance or to vote for the outcome 
they truly prefer”. In this line of thought, gerrymandering can be considered a 
practice that threatens the state of democracy in a country: “There is no greater 
threat to a democracy than when the voters lack confidence in their political 
system” (Lowenthal, 2019, p. 1). Further, Lowenthal (2019) considers that 
gerrymandering and its side effects are the factors that contributed the most to 
the pessimistic citizens perception regarding voting and elections.  
 
Another problem is that gerrymandering does not arise in a specific scenario, 
it “(…) is widespread throughout all political maps” (Lowenthal, 2019, p. 2), and 
therefore decision makers need to be aware of its possibility when considering 
changes in territorial maps.  It is also a strategy that is not exclusive to a single 
party (Lowenthal, 2019), especially in a multi-party political system, such as the 
Portuguese Republic.  
 
In addition, gerrymandering causes group-based discrimination, such as 
racial discrimination and partisan bias. As gerrymandering represents 
misrepresentations of district borders and populations due to politics (Weeden, 
2019), both racial and partisan gerrymandering (see section 1.3 of the present 
chapter) should also be prevented as they are perceived as unreasonable. 
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Succinctly, gerrymandering is a boundless practice that should be avoided as 
it presents negative outcomes to a part of the population. 
 
1.2.3 Arrangements to prevent gerrymandering 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to avoid the practice of gerrymandering. Sherstyuk 
(1998) found that imposing certain constrains (distributional and geographical) 
on districting might help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness, as it 
could restrict freedom of intervention of the decision-makers and thus turn 
gerrymandering harder to achieve. Additionally, Sherstyuk (1998) states that the 
practice of gerrymandering becomes even more difficult when equality 
constrains, like districts being obliged to have identical population size or 
identical ethnic composition, are put into practice. Summing up, the more 
restrictions applied to territory reforms, the less maneuvering margin left to the 
decision/policy makers to take advantage of the redistricting process, and so 
gerrymandering is less likely to occur. 
 
Lowenthal (2019) suggests the creation of an independent redistricting 
commission to prevent gerrymandering. In his words “Independent redistricting 
commissions are currently the best tool that voters have to mitigate political 
influence and the negative effects of gerrymandering”.  Ruley (2017) in turn, in 
addition to the independent commissions, suggests legislative reforms to prevent 
the majority party from redistricting in its favour and supplemental commissions 




1.3 Partisan gerrymandering: main cause of partisan bias 
 
Partisan gerrymandering emerges when partisan bias is associated with the 
spatial distribution of the votes, thus constituting one of the sources of partisan 
bias, as already mentioned. We are in the presence of such a practice when the 
votes’ share does not translate into seats due to how the voters are distributed. 
 
According to Lowenthal (2019), partisan gerrymandering can be formed by 
the creation of districts of unequal population sizes or by the manipulation of the 
district borders using a “cracking and packing” method.  This method consists in 
spreading the voting strength of disfavoured groups over multiple districts so its 
strength is diluted and their possibility of winning seats diminished and/or 
concentrating all the voting strength of disfavoured groups over a very few 
districts (Sauger & Grofman, 2016). It “involves wasting an opposition party's 
votes by either packing their supporters into a few districts they win by 
overwhelming majorities or spreading them thin across several districts that they 
cannot win” (Magar et al., 2017, p. 2). 
 
Distributional distortions may occur in an unintentional way through rules 
regarding the drawing of the spatial boundaries (Magar et al., 2017). 
Unintentional gerrymandering occurs when “one party’s voters are more 
geographically clustered than those of the opposing party due to residential 
patterns and human geography” (Chen & Rodden, 2013, p. 240). So, an extra 
effort may be required from the decision makers to avoid a sense of unfairness 
perceived by the citizens. 
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As it is possible that even random districting will not eliminate bias, a tradition 
districting principle should be adopted, as it is likely to decrease policy bias 
(Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2006). 
 
One thing is certain, “redistricting plans are often providing opportunities for 
debates about the intentions of those who draw the new maps” (Sauger & 
Grofman, 2016, p. 388). Whomever has the responsibility of drawing the maps 
during the redistricting process (territory reform), will always be questioned 
about their intentions: “one concern with redistricting is that those in charge may 
draw the district lines in a way that gives disproportionate influence to the 
groups they favour” (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2006, p. 382). So, when Portugal 
decided it was time to reorganize its parishes through the implementation of the 
territory reform (RAFT), the question remained if that it could be used as a 
political scheme.  
 
By way of example, Sauger and Grofman (2016) demonstrate that in France 
redistricting was conducted by the right-wing in order to favour this party, and 
they provide evidence for the redistricting of 2009 and 2012. In the next chapters 















Portugal’s administrative organization 
This section provides and extensive review of the electoral process in Portugal, 
its administrative territory organization and the most recent event regarding 
territory reform: the 2013 administrative reorganization of the territory of the 
parishes (RAFT1 from now on) in Portugal. It is particularly important to have 
this knowledge consolidated a priori in order to fully understand this 
dissertation, the methods utilized, and the data collected. 
 
1. Electoral process in Portugal 
In accordance with the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, the local 
elections occur every four years and the citizens vote for executive bodies (town 
hall [câmara municipal]) and deliberative bodies (municipal assembly 
[assembleia municipal] and parish assembly [assembleia de freguesia]). The 
president of the parish council [junta de freguesia] (also an executive body) is not 
elected by direct universal suffrage, in fact, the president is the citizen who heads 
the most voted list in the election for the parish assembly (Portal do Eleitor, 2019). 
 
 
1 Reorganização Administrativa do Território das Freguesias. 
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The Portuguese Republic elects the members for both executive and 
deliberative bodies according to the D´Hondt or Jefferson election method 
(Article 149 - Constitution of the Portuguese Republic), which consists in the 
proportionally allocation of seats (one of the proportional voting methods) 
(Niemeyer & Niemeyer, 2015). This means that if a party receives half of the 
votes, it should win about the same proportion in seats. However, a proportional 
allocation of seats does not guarantee a level of responsiveness equal to one 
(Magar et al., 2017).  
 
Also characterized by a multi-party system, Portugal has several parties 
competing to win the national2 and/or local elections. This type of political system 
is adopted by quite a few countries and has as groundwork the idea that all 
parties have a chance to form government and to own seats at the parliament 
and/or at the assemblies.  
 
Although there are several parties in the Portuguese political system running 
for government, it is common to identify parties with different ideologies but 
belonging to either left or right wings. The Portuguese Republic main political 
parties3 such as the Socialist Party (PS4), the Left Block (BE5), the Unitarian 
Democratic Coalition [CDU (PCP-PEV)6], the Democratic Social Centre - Popular 
Party (CDS-PP7) and the Social-democratic Party (PSD8), are parties that follow, 
respectively, centre-left, far-left, far-left, far-right and centre-right politics. In 
recent decades, at the legislative level, however, the governing parties have been 
 
2 There are 24 registered parties in 2019 according to the Portuguese Constitutional Court. 
3 It is considered as main political parties those who remain over time and present lists to the elections. 
4 Partido Socialista - PS 
5 Bloco de Esquerda - BE 
6 Coligação democrática unitária – CDU, which is formed by the junction of Partido Comunista Português 
(PCP) and Partido Ecologista "Os Verdes" (PEV) 
7 Centro Democrático Social – Partido Popular (CDS-PP) 
8 Partido Social Democrata - PSD 
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PS, PSD (both centre parties), or CDS in coalition with PSD (both right-wing 
parties) (SGMAI, 2019). 
 
In general, studies present a political system with only two parties competing 
(Grofman et al., 1997), or that can be simplified that way like Sauger and Grofman 
(2016) did when they studied partisan bias and redistricting in France. However, 
Magar et al. (2017) provided a study where they present a view of the partisan 
bias in a multiple parties’ system which will be equated to Portugal. 
2. Portugal’s administrative territory organization 
The Portuguese territory has a complex and unique administrative structure 
that consists in districts (distritos) that are sub-divided in counties (municípios), 
which in turn are sub-divided in parishes (freguesias). Prior to the 2013 
administrative reorganization of the territory of the parishes in Portugal, there 
were 18 districts in the mainland, plus two autonomous regions (Madeira and 
Açores) (see Figure 1), sub-divided in 308 counties which, in turn, were sub-
divided in 4260 parishes (INE, 2019).  
 
In its totality, Portugal’s territory has around 92 226 km² (INE, 2019), which 
makes it a small country. Presenting 4260 parishes in its territory means that the 
mean size of a parish would be approximately 21.6 km². By the aforementioned, 
we can have a better perception on how branched the Portuguese territory is and 
how small its parishes were. Before 2013, a debate started and the Portuguese 
parishes began to seem unnecessary and mostly inefficient, especially due to 
their small size. As Martins (2001) stated, the larger the dimension of the territory 
of the parishes, the higher the efficiency. Therefore, at that time, the Portuguese 
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government, enforced by international institutions, decided to reorganize the 
parishes in Portugal, by reducing its number (aggregating some of them). Due to 
the RAFT process, a profound restructuring of the territory was carried out, 
which resulted in a reduction in the number of parishes to 3092, and an increase 
in their mean size to around 30 km² (INE, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 1: Portuguese Territory. 




3. Administrative reorganization of the territory of the 
parishes (RAFT) 
3.1 RAFT: contextualization 
 
RAFT is an acronym used to reference the territory reform adopted in 2013 by 
the government, during the leadership of the right-wing Social-democratic Party 
(PSD) in coalition with the Democratic Social Centre – Popular Party (CDS-PP), 
that consisted in the aggregation and/or the merger of parishes and/or the change 
of its boundaries. 
 
The main reasons to implement RAFT were the settlements with international 
entities like the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – Troika – that intervened in the 
country to help overcome the 2008 crisis (Monteiro, 2015). Portugal pledged to 
reduce its expenditures, so by implementing the territory reform, supposedly, 
the country would reduce expenses by increasing local efficiency. One of the 
incentives to forge ahead with the implementation of RAFT was that the counties 
in accordance with the government were able to reduce less parishes without 
governments intervention and were given an increase of 15% of the parish’s 
funds input. 
 
On the other hand, there were also several motives against RAFT’s 
implementation: no other country in the European Union (EU) has this 
administrative territory organization/system (parishes) as Portugal, therefore 
other EU members cannot understand its functionality neither can they 
pronounce themselves about it. The arguments from the opposing side vary from 
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the government of the parishes being a small part of the overall budget (it 
represents only 0.13% of the country’s expenses), to RAFT not contributing to the 
cohesion of the villages. However, and despite the critics, the territory reform 
was implemented in 2013. 
 
According to the Article 2 from Law nº 22/2012 from 30 of May, the objectives 
of the 2013 RAFT were the “promotion of territorial cohesion and local 
development, extension of the responsibilities and competences of the parishes 
and the corresponding resources, deepening of the intervention capacity of the 
parish council, improvement and development of public proximity services 
provided by the parishes to the populations, promotion of gains in scale, 
efficiency and critical mass in local authorities and restructuring, by aggregation, 
of a significant number of parishes throughout the national territory, with special 
focus on urban areas”. To accomplish these goals, an independent unit called 
UTRAT9 (Article 13º Law nº 22/2012) was created. 
 
The independent unit was created to accompany and support the Assembly of 
the Republic in the process of the administrative reorganization, to present to the 
Assembly of the Republic concrete proposals for RAFT, in case of absence of 
pronouncement of the municipal assemblies and to propose to the municipal 
assemblies, in case of non-conformity of their pronunciation, projects for 
administrative reorganization of the parish's territory (Article 14º Law nº 
22/2012). 
 
The table below exhibits the number of parishes prior and after RAFT, and the 
difference of parishes by district and globally, in number and in percentage. 
 
9 Unidade Técnica para Reorganização Administrativa do Território – Technical Unit to the Administrative 











the number of 
parishes 
Difference in the 
number of 
parishes (%) 
Aveiro 208 147 61 -29.33% 
Beja 100 75 25 -25.00% 
Braga 515 347 168 -32.62% 
Bragança 299 226 73 -24.41% 
Castelo Branco 160 120 40 -25.00% 
Coimbra 209 155 54 -25.84% 
Évora 91 69 22 -24.18% 
Faro 84 67 17 -20.24% 
Guarda 336 242 94 -27.98% 
Leiria  148 110 38 -25.68% 
Lisboa  226 134 92 -40.71% 
Portalegre 86 69 17 -19.77% 
Porto 383 243 140 -36.55% 
Santarém 193 141 52 -26.94% 
Setúbal 82 55 27 -32.93% 
Viana do Castelo 290 208 82 -28.28% 
Vila Real 268 197 71 -26.49% 
Viseu 372 277 95 -25.54% 
Total Continent 4050 2882 1168 -28.84% 
Autonomous Region 
of Madeira 
54 54 0 0.00% 
Autonomous Region 
of Açores 
156 156 0 0.00% 
Total Country 4260 3092 1168 -27.42% 
 
Table 1: Effects of RAFT by district. 
Source: Portal do Eleitor, 2019. 
 
RAFT has altered most of the Portuguese territory organization, yet, the two 
autonomous regions of Madeira and Açores remained unaltered, both places 
were not intervened during the reform. 
 
As shown in Table 1, Portugal had 4260 parishes in 2013 and has at the present 
date 3092, thus reducing a total of 1168 parishes. In Porto’s district the changes 
were considerable, keeping only 243 parishes, which represented a reduction of 
140 parishes (-36.55%). Porto’s district had one of the largest reductions in its 
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parishes, only being surpassed in percentage by Lisboa that presented a 
reduction of 40% of its parishes.  
 
Despite requiring the preservation of the historical, cultural and social identity 
of local communities (Article 3 Law nº 22/2012), the territory reform of 2013 was 
binding, and the adjustments in the territory are the ones exhibited in Figure 2. 
The figure shows the Portuguese territory, detailed at the district level (heavier 
black lines) and at the county level (less pronounced black lines). The counties 
that presented no alteration in its parishes, i.e., that had no consequences in the 
voter registration appear in yellow (76 counties where this occur). The counties 
that had their parish aggregated (219 counties) are depicted in green. Finally, the 
counties that had their parish aggregated and that suffered changes in their 
boundaries (13 counties) are represented in red. 
 
 
Figure 2: Counties affected by RAFT. 
Source: Publication “Know what has changed with the administrative reorganization of the 
territory of the parishes” of Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE) and Direção Geral de 
Administração Interna (DGAI). 
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3.2 RAFT: Porto’s district 
Administratively, Porto’s district has 18 counties, scattered like in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Porto’s district and its counties. 
Source: Espírito Viajante. 
 
One particularity to consider is that the territory reform was implemented 
with certain constraints. The number of inhabitants and population density of 
each county were the most important constrains in this framework of RAFT. 
 
 In accordance with Article 4 of Law nº 22/2012, for the effect of restructuring, 
the counties were grouped in 3 levels. The counties in Level 1 were the ones who 
had a population density superior to 1000 inhabitants per km2 and a population 
equal or superior to 40000 inhabitants. Counties in Level 2 had a population 
density superior to 1000 inhabitants per km2 and a population inferior to 40000 
inhabitants or population density between 100 and 1000 inhabitants per km2 and 
a population equal or superior to 25000 inhabitants. Counties in Level 3 
presented a population density between 100 and 1000 inhabitants per km2 and a 
population inferior to 25000 inhabitants or a population density inferior to 100 
inhabitants per km2. Every level had a specific percentage reduction that the 
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counties should follow in order to reduce and aggregate its parishes. Also, after 
RAFT there could not exist a parish with less than 150 inhabitants.  
 
Regarding Porto’s district: Gondomar, Maia, Matosinhos, Porto, Valongo and 
Vila Nova de Gaia belonged to Level 1; Amarante, Felgueiras, Lousada, Marco 
de Canaveses, Paços de Ferreira, Paredes, Penafiel, Póvoa de Varzim, Santo Tirso, 
Trofa and Vila do Conde to Level 2; and Baião to Level 3. Table 2 presents all 
counties in the district of Porto, the number of parishes each one had prior to 
RAFT and has after RAFT, and the absolute and relative difference in the number 










the number of 
parishes 
Difference in 
the number of 
parishes (%) 
Amarante 40 26 14 -35.00% 
Baião 20 14 6 -30.00% 
Felgueiras 32 20 12 -37.50% 
Gondomar 12 7 5 -41.67% 
Lousada 25 15 10 -40.00% 
Maia 17 10 7 -41.18% 
Marco de Canaveses 31 16 15 -48.39% 
Matosinhos 10 4 6 -60.00% 
Paços de Ferreira 16 12 4 -25.00% 
Paredes 24 18 6 -25.00% 
Penafiel 38 28 10 -26.32% 
Porto 15 7 8 -53.33% 
Póvoa de Varzim 12 7 5 -41.67% 
Santo Tirso 24 14 10 -41.67% 
Trofa 8 5 3 -37.50% 
Valongo 5 4 1 -20.00% 
Vila do Conde 30 21 9 -30.00% 
Vila Nova de Gaia 24 15 9 -37.50% 
Total in Porto’s district 383 243 140 -36.55% 
 
Table 2: Effects of RAFT in Porto’s district. 
Source: Secretaria Geral do Ministério da Administração Interna (SGMAI). 
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The government implemented this territory reform. However, this does not 
mean that the counties supported this idea. In fact, some of the counties 
represented in Table 2 did not comply with this restructure due to multiple 
reasons. In case of absence of pronouncement (did not issue an opinion to the 
government), situation that occurred namely in Amarante, Baião, Felgueiras, 
Gondomar, Lousada, Matosinhos, Porto, Póvoa de Varzim, Santo Tirso, Trofa, 
Valongo and Vila do Conde,10 and in case of non-conformity of the 
pronouncement (issue a non-conforming opinion), which happened in counties 
such as Paços de Ferreira and Vila Nova de Gaia, 11 it was up to UTRAT to present 
the proposal for the new parish territory organization to the Assembly of the 
Republic. In the eventuality of accepting the terms of the government regarding 
RAFT (and therefore being able to reduce less parishes), like Maia, Marco de 
Canaveses, Paredes and Penafiel did,12 it was up to themselves to create a 
proposal of reorganization of their own parishes.  
Redistricting favours some groups, in one hand and, it harms others, on the 
other hand. The 2013 reorganization of the territory led to the reduction of the 
number of parishes, but most importantly, it led to a profound re-distribution of 
the voters and this is something that concerned the competing parties and the 
voters as they were obligated to readjust to the new parishes, to different local 
government and even to different public facilities (that led to less proximity to 
the citizens, and were caused by the mergers of the parishes). 
 
Baldersheim and Rose (2010) said that the success of the implementation of a 
reform includes, among other factors, “the capability of policy entrepreneurs to 
form advocacy coalitions and of their opponents to form veto alliances (…)”. 
 
10 Relatório Síntese UTRAT - Summary Report UTRAT. 
11 Summary Report UTRAT. 
12 Summary Report UTRAT. 
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However, an administrative territory reform can be adopted with the intent of 
favouriting a certain party, namely by adopting a partisan gerrymandering 
strategy. In this dissertation, we are mainly concerned with this secondary 







Partisan bias and gerrymandering in Porto’s 
district: a data analysis 
The data analysis chapter presents the research strategy adopted and the data 
collected to answer the research questions. It comprises an explanation of the 




The data collected is used in a quantitative research, which offers a high level 
of thoroughness fundamental to this type of study.  
The sample was gathered in Porto’s district, in its 18 counties and respective 
parishes, in three local elections: 2009, 2013 and 2017, which represent the years 
before and after RAFT, and the most recent year of local elections. Porto was the 
district chosen due to its feasibility: despite the high quantity of data to be 
treated, it was feasible in the time planned for the study; we were familiar with 
the district and respective counties; and more important, it is the second largest 
Portuguese city economically speaking. 
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The main variable to consider in the analysis is partisan bias, a continuous 
variable that can be assessed as the value of the difference between the vote-share 
and the seat-share. This variable will be analysed in each county regarding the 
three local observed elections, and afterwards explored to comprehend whether 
a gerrymandering strategy was conducted in the second most important district 
of Portugal. In the database there are 202 observations of partisan bias. 
 
We gathered the vote-share of each party per county - which translates in the 
sum of all the votes each party received in the parishes divided by the sum of all 
votes – and the seat-share of each party. The seat-share in this case is calculated as 
the number of local elections won by a party divided by the number of parishes 
in a county. Remembering that the winning party in each parish elects the 
president of the parish council, the seat-share is calculated as the sum of the 
number of presidents each party elected in its parishes divided by the total 
number of parishes in a county. 
 
The information needed to construct the database to this dissertation can be 
found at Secretaria Geral do Ministério da Administração Interna (SGMAI), 
which is a website of the Portuguese department of Internal Affairs. It provided 
all the results of the local election by district, county and parish required. 
 
The data regarding independent parties will be excluded from the analysis as 
it does not appear relevant to answer the research questions. All the parties that 
do not remain over the years in the local elections are not eligible for this study 
because they do not provide a comparison term, making it impossible to study 
gerrymandering strategies.  
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2. Data Analysis 
Most of the counties in this study recognize a bias between the vote-share and 
the seat-share relation (partisan bias). In this section we aspire to highlight the 
partisan bias by county and to discuss the possibility of the existence of 
gerrymandering in each one of Porto’s counties.  
 
Regarding the methodology, it is important to remember that the core of the 
analysis is to show whether a political scheme was conducted mainly from the 
comparison of the local elections of 2009 and 2013, therefore, it is not worth to 
scrutinize the political parties that do not remain over time, such as the 
independent parties. Moreover, in the analytical chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4), the PSD, the CDS-PP and the PSD with other coalitions of right-wing are 
considered as one and will be aggregated (in the case that they are not) to enable 
the comparative analysis. This measure is necessary to standardize the data 
because, in some counties, in 2009, those parties competed in separated and in 
the 2013 RAFT they competed together. By performing this aggregation, we are 
approaching the idea that a multi-party system can be equated to a bi-partisan 
system, where parties are clustered in two main groups: right and left wing, 
meeting the vision of Sauger and Grofman (2016) and (Sherstyuk, 1998). 
 
Having that assumption in mind, we analysed the voting information (the 
vote-share, the seat-share and the difference between the two: partisan bias), 
based on tables and graphs,13 to determine important interactions. Solely by 
looking at this information per county and per party, during the three years in 
study it is possible to draw some conclusions.  
 
13 The tables can be seen in the Appendices. 
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For all counties, despite the small percentage, the party B.E always received 
votes. However, they never translated into seats, meaning that B.E never won the 
local elections in any parish of any county in the years in study. Both party B.E 
and party PCP-PEV had residual results. Thus, they are not significant for this 
analysis. 
 
As we can observe from Figure 4, that illustrates the partisan bias in Amarante 
in 2009, 2013 and 2017, Amarante had a favouriting partisan bias regarding the 
party PPD/PSD.CDS-PP in 2009. It had 41.59% of the total votes (sum of 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP votes in all its parishes), 14 but it managed to have 47.50% of 
the seats to the parish’s councils, presenting a bias of 5.91 percentual points (pp) 
for this party. Moreover, the partisan bias between 2009 and 2013 decreases for 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP and increases for PS. Sealing this, in Amarante it is not 
apparent that gerrymandering occurred, as it was up to PPD/PSD.CDS-PP, as 
government, to redistrict. In fact, it is more suggestive a gerrymandering strategy 
in favour of PS during RAFT. 
 
 
Figure 4: Partisan bias in Amarante, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
14 For the exact values of vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias referenced in this Chapter, consult the 







Partisan bias in Amarante
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
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The county Baião presents a dichotomy: a continuously high positive partisan 
bias in favour of PS (22.78 pp in 2009, 22.27 pp in 2013 and 23.08 pp in 2017) that 
contrast with a continuously high negative partisan bias in detriment of 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP (-18.56 pp in 2009, -16.32 pp in 2013 and -18.21 pp in 2017). The 
outcomes, beheld in Figure 5, hinder the assumption that a gerrymandering 
strategy in favour of PPD/PSD.CDS-PP was carried out in Baião. 
 
 
Figure 5: Partisan bias in Baião, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
 
In Felgueiras, where RAFT was conducted by the government, we observe, in 
Figure 6, a decrease in the positive partisan bias in favour of PPD/PSD.CDS-PP, 


















Figure 6: Partisan bias in Felgueiras, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
 
From 2009 to 2013, Gondomar increased a lot its partisan bias in favour of PS, 
going from 5.66 pp in 2009 to 45.42 pp in 2013. Even though partisan bias 
remained high for PS in 2017, as highlighted in Figure 7, this information 
suggests that a gerrymandering strategy could have been carried out in favour 
of PS in 2013 and not PPD/PSD.CDS-PP as expected, due to the fact that RAFT in 
this county was performed by the government. 
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Partisan bias in Gondomar
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
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Figure 8 shows that Lousada is a county that commutes its preferences, in a 
way, that the positive partisan bias existent in 2009 in favour of PS switches and, 
in 2013, it favours the direct competitor PPD/PSD.CDS-PP. Gerrymandering 
seems to occur in this county, as the party PPD/PSD.CDS-PP (the party of the 




Figure 8: Partisan bias in Lousada, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
 
Maia is a county where PPD/PSD.CDS-PP’s preferences prevailed, as observed 
in Figure 9. It is a county that appears to benefit from gerrymandering as well, as 
the continuously positive partisan bias increases in 2013, reaching 52.70 pp and 
where RAFT was handled by the government. Even though Maia had already a 
bias in favour of the right-wing party, it reaches a higher partisan bias in the year 
of the territory reform. With 37.30% of the votes, PPD/PSD.CDS-PP won 90% of 










Partisan bias in Lousada
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
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Figure 9: Partisan bias in Maia, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
In Marco de Canaveses (RAFT conducted by PPD/PSD.CDS-PP as 
government) and Paços de Ferreira (RAFT conducted by PPD/PSD.CDS-PP  from 
Paços de Ferreira) we observe a decrease in partisan bias (see Figures 10 and 11), 
and in Marco de Canaveses there is a positive partisan bias for both 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP and PS, which does not indicate that gerrymandering was a 
reality in both counties. 
 
 
















Partisan bias in Maia













Partisan bias in Marco de Canaveses
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
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Figure 11: Partisan bias in Paços de Ferreira, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
Matosinhos shows a tremendous bias in favour of left-wing parties in the years 
studied, to the point of PS winning 100% of the seats in 2017, with only 35.72% of 
the votes. As Figure 12 demonstrates, an independent left-wing party was able 
to win the local elections of 2013. Matosinhos, which let the government conduct 
RAFT, does not show signs of gerrymandering (since the PPD/PSD.CDS-PP won 
zero seats in 2013 and in 2017). 
 
 


























Partisan bias in Matosinhos
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP Guilherme Pinto por Matosinhos PS PCP-PEV
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Both Paredes and Penafiel present a positive partisan bias in favour of 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP and a negative partisan bias for PS. The difference is that the 
partisan bias is overall reducing in Paredes (Figure 13), specially in 2017 and 
increasing in Penafiel (Figure 14). In these municipalities, gerrymandering may 
have occurred, as RAFT was achieved by the government in both, and 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP is the party favoured, mainly in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 13: Partisan bias in Paredes, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
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Partisan bias in Penafiel
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
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In Porto, the independent party RM15 (a special case), was able to win the 
presidency in most of the parishes (about 71% of the seats) with less than 50% of 
the votes, both in 2013 and 2017. Apparently, gerrymandering did not occur in 
Porto as the government party PPD/PSD.CDS-PP is not being favoured after 
RAFT, as we see in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15: Partisan bias in Porto, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
Póvoa de Varzim and Trofa had a negative partisan bias for PS and a positive 
partisan bias for PPD/PSD.CDS-PP during the three elections in study. This 
disparity is increasing and may indicate the occurrence of gerrymandering in the 
territory reform of 2013, accomplished by the government, in both counties. The 
county Póvoa de Varzim, represented in Figure 16, however, seems to present 
higher values regarding partisan bias. In 2013 it presents a partisan bias as high 
as 36.11 pp for PPD/PSD.CDS-PP, whether the highest value for partisan bias in 
Trofa (Figure 17) is 23.63 pp and only occurs in 2017. 
 
 











Partisan bias in Porto
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS RM PCP-PEV
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Figure 16: Partisan bias in Póvoa de Varzim, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
 
Figure 17: Partisan bias in Trofa, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
Some counties, such as Santo Tirso, Valongo and Vila do Conde, where the 
reform was executed by the government, had a positive partisan bias in favour 
of PS, contradicting the hypothesis of the practice of gerrymandering in the 
aggregational territory reform of 2013. In Santo Tirso, see Figure 18, and in Vila 
do Conde (Figure 20), the partisan bias improves for PPD/PSD.CDS-PP in 2013 
but it is still negative, meaning that the vote-share is higher than the seat-share. 
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Partisan bias in Trofa
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
 57 
but for the same party, had a negative partisan bias in 2013 (-6.42 pp) and even 
more negative in 2017 (-24.13 pp). 
 
 
Figure 18: Partisan bias in Santo Tirso, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
 





















Partisan bias in Valongo
B.E PPD/PSD.CDS-PP PS PCP-PEV
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Figure 20: Partisan bias in Vila do Conde, per party, in 2009, 2013 and 2017. 
 
In Vila Nova de Gaia, PPD/PSD.CDS-PP, the right-wing coalition had a 
partisan bias in its favour in 2009 but the roles switched and in 2013 and 2017 
there was a high positive partisan bias in favour of the left-wing party PS, as we 
can observe in Figure 21. This could have been an effect of RAFT and an extreme 
measure to show the disagreement with the government, and therefore it does 
not seem that gerrymandering occurred in the county in question. Vila Nova de 
Gaia’s PPD/PSD.CDS-PP was the one responsible to reorganize the counties’ 
parishes. 
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Regardless of the partisan bias being seen in every county, the mean of the 
partisan bias is 1.32 (see Appendix)16. But if we consider the standard deviation 
(14.15), we can understand that partisan bias is in fact, significant. In some 
counties the standard deviation is such that we can say that during the years in 
study there was a clear bias regarding the different parties. There are counties 
such as Gondomar, Maia, Matosinhos and Vila Nova de Gaia, that present higher 
partisan bias and there are others like Amarante, Felgueiras, Lousada and 
Penafiel where the bias is not so evident.  
 
Here, the existence of partisan bias is considered based only on the geographic 
distribution of partisan support or gerrymandering, so we can state that counties 
such as Lousada, Maia, Paredes, Penafiel, Póvoa de Varzim and Trofa present 
data more likely to be derived from gerrymandering practices. 
 
Analysing partisan bias as having a unique cause (geographic distribution of 
partisan support) can translate into some limitations. For that reason, to 
complement the study, in the next chapter, and considering other variables that 
influence partisan bias, we test the hypothesis of partisan bias being caused by 
RAFT using regression methods.  
 
16 This may be due to the fact that negative and positive values offset each other. If we take the average of 






The influence of RAFT on partisan bias: a 
regression analysis 
In this chapter we evaluate the connection between meaningful variables to 
partisan bias and gerrymandering, by using linear regression. The purpose of the 
regression is to understand how the partisan bias is influenced by the party who 
executed the RAFT, and the susceptibility of occurring gerrymandering. 
1. Data 
For the regression analysis we continue to use the variable partisan bias. Here, 
however, we use composite data (differences in the partisan bias through the 
years) that derived from the primary data (partisan bias per year), which was 
already used and explained in the previous chapter. We opt to use the differences 
in the partisan bias because we want to understand the changes in partisan bias, 
i.e., if the increases or decreases in the partisan bias where influenced by RAFT. 
Also, using the partisan bias per year instead of the differences in the partisan 
bias would not allow us to test the hypothesis we want conveniently.  
 
Table 3 reveals the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression. 
Both ΔPB0913 and ΔPB0917 represent the partisan bias (PB) and are the 
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dependent variables of our regressions. While ΔPB0913 symbolizes the 
difference in the partisan bias in the counties from the party that executed the 
RAFT between 2009 and 2013, ΔPB0917 indicates the difference in the partisan 
bias between 2009 and 2017. We use ΔPB0913 to test the short-term effects of 
RAFT on partisan bias and ΔPB0917 to test if RAFT produced long-term effects 
on partisan bias. These two variables present a negative mean and a high 
standard deviation (SD), which reinforces the existence of high partisan bias 
during the years in study. The independent variable is RAFT that takes the value 
1 if the territory reform was carried out by PPD/PSD.CDS-PP as the government 
and 0 otherwise. The other variables considered are the control variables of the 
model. In total, there are 18 observations, that represent the number of tested 
counties. 
 
Being unique models, it is also important to explain and highlight the control 
variables considered and summarized in Table 3. We contemplate dummy 
variables such as Counties that reflects a dummy for each county of Porto´s 
district, Sameparty0913 and Sameparty0917, two dummies that take the value 1 if 
the town hall was governed by the same party in 2009 and 2013 and in 2009 and 
2017, respectively, and 0 if not and along the same lines of thought Samepresi0913 
and Samepresi0917, that take the value 1 if the town hall was governed by the 
same president in 2009 and 2013 and in 2009 and 2017, and 0 else way. One 
curiosity is that Samepresi0917 always takes the value 0, because there was no 







Variables Mean SD Min Max 
ΔPB0913 -3.624 16.829 -41.18 22.31 
ΔPB0917 -8.194 18.559 -47.26 19.98 
RAFT 0.889 0.323 0 1 
Sameparty0913 0.556 0.511 0 1 
Sameparty0917 0.389 0.502 0 1 
Samepresi0913 0.278 0.461 0 1 
Unemp13 0.129 0.023 0.071 0.16 
Unemp17 0.081 0.020 0.046 0.125 
Counties           9.5 5.338 1 18 
Each variable has 18 observation, one for each county tested. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the linear regression. 
2. The influence of RAFT on the partisan bias 
We selected the previously explained data in order to study the influence that 
RAFT exerts on the partisan bias. As mentioned in the preceding chapters, RAFT 
was a major territory reform in the parishes in Portugal. We want to understand 
the extent of RAFT´s border alteration impact on the voting outcomes, because 
considering these results, we can afterwards discuss if a gerrymandering strategy 
was utilized. If RAFT was a mean to increase partisan bias in favour of the policy 
makers, in this case in favour of party PPD/PSD.CDS-PP as government, then the 
government may have resorted to a gerrymandering strategy. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no literature exploring such relationship, which increases the 
relevance of this study. 
 
The model, which aims to examine the influence of RAFT on the partisan bias, 
gives us two regressions, one regarding the short-term effects and one regarding 
the long-term effects. In the short-term regression, we considered the differences 
from 2009 to 2013, the year of RAFT application, and in the long-term regression 
we considered the differences from 2009 to 2017 to understand if RAFT had long-
term effects in the partisan bias of the counties.  
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As some of the Porto’s counties and their parishes were aggregated by the 
government and others by themselves during RAFT, it is important to 
distinguish both and to understand which ones produced a higher partisan bias. 
For this intent, we analysed the impact of the difference between the ones where 
the government decided and the ones where it was up to the county to decide 
(Paços de Ferreira and Vila Nova de Gaia). In the latter situation, by coincidence, 
the party that decided RAFT was the same (PPD/PSD.CDS-PP) across the 
counties, and the same as the party in government, which explains the few 
variables being considered.  
 
The model constructed is given by: 
 
𝛾𝑖  =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝒳𝑖 +  Ω +  𝜀𝑖 , 
 
where 𝛾𝑖 represents the explained (dependent) variable; in this case, the 
differences in partisan bias from 2009 to 2013 and from 2009 to 2017, in 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP party. 𝒳𝑖 is the explanatory (independent) variable, the RAFT 
dummy, Ω represents a vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. The 
control variables aim to avoid problems of endogeneity, i.e., to prevent the 
estimate ( ?̂? ) from being biased. The ?̂? is the mean estimated difference in the 
partisan bias between the case when there is the government deciding RAFT and 







2.1 Short-term effects 
 
For the short-term effects we have the following model: 
 
(1) 𝛥𝑃𝐵0913𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝐹𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦0913𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖0913𝑖 +
+ 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝13𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 
 
Considering regression (1), we obtained the results shown in Table 4. Here, we 
found that keeping the same party in authority from 2009 to 2013 in the town hall 
influences significantly (5%) the difference in the partisan bias in those years. 
Counties that maintained the same party in government of the town hall had a 
17.11 pp superior partisan bias than the ones who altered it. Both RAFT and 
Sameparty0913 influence positively the partisan bias. The fact that RAFT 
occurred, increases in 14.38 pp the partisan bias, but RAFT is not a statistically 
significant variable in this regression.  
 
 
The table presents the robust standard errors in parentheses and the asterisks denote the p-value              
(*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1). 


















Since Sameparty0913 has a higher coefficient level and is statistically 
significant, we decided to see if the variable RAFT and the variable Sameparty0913 
are correlated. After realizing this interaction, we calculated the coefficient of 
correlation between the two variables, in order to show this relation. The high 
level of correlation between them (0.3953) evidences the obvious interaction. 
RAFT was a major transformation in the administrative organization of the 
counties, that led to big changes in small villages, and therefore it is mirrored in 
the voter’s choices in the elections. At the time, some parties lost their influence 
towards the citizens as a consequence of the disapproval with the territory 
reform. The voters blamed the party adjudicating for the changes in their daily 
lives and the way to show it was by voting in the opposite party. 
 
Even though RAFT is not significant, it is important to keep both RAFT and 
Sameparty0913, or otherwise the model would be biased. Despite the influence 
RAFT has on the Sameparty0913, there are other factors in Sameparty0913 that 
explain the difference in partisan bias but are not influenced by RAFT. 
 
In regression (1), ΔPB0913 is also negatively affected by the unemployment 
rate of 2013, which suggests that the unemployment rate tends to decrease the 
partisan bias in the counties.  
 
The increases and decreases of the partisan bias from 2009 to 2013 appear to 
have other causes beyond RAFT, since it is not significant. In conclusion, in the 
short-term, the effects of RAFT on partisan bias appear to be narrow.  However, 
although the effects of RAFT may have not been evident immediately after its 
implementation, they may have been pervasive over a longer time period. This 
is what we test next. 
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2.2 Long-term effects 
 
The variables considered in the long-term are similar to the ones considered 
in the short-term. The difference relies on the fact that in regression (2) there is 
no Samepresi0917 variable, as there was no president that governed in 2009 and 
2017 in the counties in study. 
 
(2) 𝛥𝑃𝐵0917𝑖  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝐹𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦0917𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝17𝑖 +
 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 
 
Observing Table 5 (based on the regression (2)) it appears that, in the long-
term, RAFT being conducted by the government was very significant (at 1%). It 
increased the difference in the partisan bias from 2009 to 2017 in 25.98 pp, which 
shows that the effects of the territory reform are visible in the long-term, even 
more than in the short-term. These results may be a consequence of a strategically 
and intentional gerrymandering. 
 
The Sameparty0917 and the Unemp17 are also significant (at 5%), affecting the 
dependent variable positively and negatively, respectively. From 2009 to 2017 we 
observe even more significant outcomes than the ones in the short-term, and 






















The table presents the robust standard errors in parentheses and the asterisks denote the p-value              
(*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1). 
Table 5: Linear regression: effects of RAFT on ΔPB0917. 
 
The main conclusion that this model provides is that the counties where it is 
up to the government to decide about RAFT (RAFT=1), it is more likely to observe 
a higher partisan bias, which may indicate that the aggregation of the parishes 
was intentionally conducted in a way that favours the government. In the regions 
where RAFT=1, it became easier to win seats with less percentage of the votes, 
i.e., they had a higher positive partisan bias, and therefore the likelihood of our 
hypothesis increases, as it seem that gerrymandering was in fact embodied in the 
territory reform. 
 
However, this analysis has some limitations, including the small number of 
observations (18) and the eventual problems of endogeneity due to the omission 
of variables that may be correlated with RAFT. 
 
From this chapter, and despite the limitations, we can also conclude that RAFT 
has a very significant impact in the change of the governing party and has 
become more relevant in the long run, where it has a very significant impact in 






Results and Discussion 
Throughout this dissertation, a lot has been discussed about bias, so, and in 
order to complete this unbiased study, we present this section where we discuss 
the observed results and disclose some associated limitations.  
 
In Chapter 3, we concluded that Lousada, Maia, Paredes, Penafiel, Póvoa de 
Varzim and Trofa were counties where gerrymandering was more likely to 
occur, based on the voting information of the local elections of 2009, 2013 and 
2017, which are not necessarily the counties who present a higher partisan bias, 
but those who present a benefit towards PPD/PSD.CDS-PP party and whose 
parishes were mutated by that same governing party. The same is saying that 
one third of Porto´s counties exhibits evidences of gerrymandering. 
 
Chapter 4 provides us the measurement of the effects that RAFT had on 
partisan bias. The significant outcomes found gives us confidence to consider 
that RAFT was a major partisan bias increaser. The main inference the regression 
analysis provided was that in the counties where it was up to the government to 
lead RAFT´s implementation, there is a higher positive partisan bias in the benefit 
of PPD/PSD.CDS-PP. By winning seats, or parishes assemblies in our case, with 
a less percentage of the votes, PPD/PSD.CDS-PP as government was benefited by 
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RAFT. It indicates that a gerrymandering may have occurred during RAFT and 
in favour of the government at the time.  
 
The concerns of the findings of this study rely on the fact that the negative 
outcomes of gerrymandering go beyond the year of the implementation of RAFT 
and have even higher effects in the long run. It would be important to dwell 
further on the question of why RAFT’s effects on partisan bias are more 
pronounced in the long-run, as the growing concern about a rotted benefit in 
favor of PPD/PSD.CDS-PP rises. 
 
Even though RAFT´s implementation met the requirements to prevent the 
practice of gerrymandering, it is likely to have occurred. At the time, the reform 
had equality and population constrains and an independent redistricting 
commission (UTRAT), as suggested by Sherstyuk (1998) and Lowenthal (2019) 
respectively, which should prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. But, as 
the results show, it was not enough to prevent it in the Portuguese territory, and 
maybe some additional constrains were required. Supplemental commissions 
alongside UTRAT should also have been implemented  (Ruley, 2017). 
 
Despite the outcomes of the two previous chapters, we cannot state that 
gerrymandering was a reality in Portugal undoubtedly, due to some crucial 
limitations. Firstly, as the research only considers Porto’s district it is hard to 
extrapolate results to the entire country. Secondly there are assumptions that 
could, if not considered, provide different outcomes such as the junction of PSD, 
CDS-PP and PSD with other coalitions in one and the disregard of independent 
parties. Another aspect to consider is that people´s preferences in politics may 
change due to several reasons that may not be considered in either of the control 
variables in the regression analysis. Also, the gerrymandering and the 
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Thinking about the standpoint of Kathryn D. Cramer and Hank Wasiak, 
“When you change the way you see things, the things you see change”, this 
dissertation was carried in an open minded and best practices way. It was written 
without taking sides, considering personal opinions or political affiliations.  
 
 Aiming to clarify the existence of gerrymandering in Portugal, this thesis 
contributes to an increase research on this topic, bringing it to the Portuguese 
reality. This gap, discovered during the literature review (Chapter 1), was the 
starting point of this dissertation. The definition of gerrymandering, political bias 
and partisan bias in the literature review made it possible to internalize the main 
concepts adopted and verified afterwards. 
 
Bringing this global information, trying to apply it and having to transform it 
so it could fit the Portugal’s specific features was a challenge. In Chapter 2 we 
explain how the Portuguese territory was organized administratively, how is the 
electoral process conducted and what positive and negative effects has RAFT 
caused, and why that event was chosen to test for gerrymandering strategies.  
 
The study incorporates a sample (Porto’s district), as an example of what can 
be done in this field of study. The data collected was explained and used in 
Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4. With the vote-share and the seat-share of each parish 
of each county we were able to calculate the partisan bias and conclude that some 
counties such as Lousada, Maia, Paredes, Penafiel, Póvoa de Varzim and Trofa 
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were more propitious to have suffered from intentional gerrymandering in their 
territory during RAFT. We also determine that RAFT significantly influenced the 
partisan bias due to the outcomes of our regressions. In fact, we are able to say 
that gerrymandering was a reality in Porto´s district in the local elections of 2013, 
during RAFT, but we can only assume that it was intentional. 
 
Being the sample size reduced, it would be risky to extrapolate the data 
obtained to the whole country, therefore, it could be interesting to increase the 
sample size and compile the data from the entire country. Despite the small 
sample size and what it implies, this dissertation is very useful as it provides a 
unique perspective in what concerns testing and processing the voting 
information.  
 
One way to further explore the research would be to enlarge the data by 
considering other districts in Portugal and even other countries. Furthermore, the 
Portuguese government has announced, recently, that a reversion of the 
reorganization of the territory of the parishes could be a possibility in the future. 
It may also be interesting to analyse this potential reversal.  
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B.E 1.75% 0.00% -1.75 1.03% 0.00% -1.03 0.87% 0.00% -0.87 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 41.59% 47.50%   5.91 37.98% 42.31% 4.33 45.80% 50.00% 4.20 
PS 43.29% 40.00%  -3.29 40.94% 50.00% 9.06 44.79% 46.15% 1.37 
PCP-PEV 1.92% 0.00%  -1.92 1.96% 0.00% -1.96 1.78% 0.00% -1.78 
Table A1: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Amarante. 
County: Baião 
Parties 



















PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 38.56% 20.00% -18.56 30.60% 14.29% -16.32 32.50% 14.29% -18.21 
PS 57.22% 80.00% 22.78 63.45% 85.71% 22.27 62.63% 85.71% 23.08 
PCP-PEV 1.42% 0.00% -1.42 1.85% 0.00% -1.85 1.40% 0.00% -1.40 


























B.E 0.85% 0.00% -0.85 1.26% 0.00% -1.26 n.a n.a n.a 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 42.80% 56.25% 13.45 54.82% 60.00% 5.18 50.27% 55.00% 4.73 
PS* 33.02% 28.13% -4.90 35.19% 35.00% -0.19 38.19% 35.00% -3.19 
PCP-PEV 2.57% 0.00% -2.57 3.12% 0.00% -3.12 2.88% 0.00% -2.88 
Table A3: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Felgueiras. 
County: Gondomar 
Parties 



















B.E 4.75% 0.00% -4.75 4.18% 0.00% -4.18 4.73% 0.00% -4.73 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP 32.78% 41.67% 8.89 22.47% 0.00% -22.47 16.86% 0.00% -16.86 
PS 44.34% 50.00% 5.66 40.29% 85.71% 45.42 40.88% 85.71% 44.83 
PCP-PEV 10.03% 8.33% -1.70 15.93% 14.29% -1.64 16.09% 14.29% -1.80 
Table A4: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Gondomar. 
County: Lousada 
Parties 



















B.E n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.50% 0.00% -0.50 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP 41.79% 40.00% -1.79 46.55% 53.33% 6.78 48.19% 53.33% 5.14 
PS 44.92% 56.00% 11.08 45.96% 40.00% -5.96 46.33% 46.67% 0.34 
PCP-PEV 2.57% 0.00% -2.57 2.71% 0.00% -2.71 1.87% 0.00% -1.87 








Table A6: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Maia. 
County: Marco de Canaveses 
Parties 



















B.E n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.65% 0.00% -0.65 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 39.10% 54.84% 15.74 39.57% 50.00% 10.43 43.27% 37.50% -5.77 
PS 21.00% 9.68% -11.32 31.01% 43.75% 12.74 35.34% 56.25% 20.91 
PCP-PEV 3.42% 3.23% -0.20 5.81% 0.00% -5.81 4.99% 6.25% 1.26 
Table A7: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Marco de Canaveses. 
County: Matosinhos 
Parties 



















B.E 3.86% 0.00% -3.86 4.20% 0.00% -4.20 6.05% 0.00% -6.05 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 21.24% 10.00% -11.24 12.82% 0.00% -12.82 13.12% 0.00% -13.12 
Guilherme Pinto por Matosinhos n.a n.a n.a 39.75% 100% 60.25 n.a n.a n.a 
PS 40.47% 90.00% 49.53 26.03% 0.00% -26.03 35.72% 100% 64.28 
PCP-PEV 5.30% 0.00% -5.30 7.94% 0.00% -7.94 7.05% 0.00% -7.05 
Table A8: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Matosinhos. 
County: Maia 
Parties 



















B.E 4.71% 0.00% -4.71 5.02% 0.00% -5.02 6.65% 0.00% -6.65 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 50.10% 82.35% 32.25 37.30% 90.00% 52.70 40.76% 70.00% 29.24 
PS* 33.36% 11.76% -21.59 26.12% 0.00% -26.12 35.84% 20.00% -15.84 
PCP-PEV 5.03% 0.00% -5.03 7.50% 0.00% -7.50 5.92% 0.00% -5.92 
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County: Paços de Ferreira 
Parties 



















PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 56.55% 87.50% 30.95 48.97% 66.67% 17.70 40.83% 41.67% 0.84 
PS 38.33% 12.50% -25.83 43.78% 33.33% -10.44 49.66% 58.33% 8.67 
PCP-PEV 2.88% 0.00% -2.88 3.42% 0.00% -3.42 2.08% 0.00% -2.08 
Table A9: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Paços de Ferreira. 
County: Paredes 
Parties 



















B.E 0.15% 0.00% -0.15 0.94% 0.00% -0.94 1.17% 0.00% -1.17 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 62.23% 79.17% 16.94 47.38% 72.22% 24.84 45.21% 50.00% 4.79 
PS 29.20% 16.67% -12.54 35.68% 22.22% -13.46 45.38% 44.44% -0.93 
PCP-PEV 5.16% 4.17% -1.00 6.97% 5.56% -1.41 3.27% 5.56% 2.29 
Table A10: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Paredes. 
County: Penafiel 
Parties 



















B.E 0.39% 0.00% -0.39 0.74% 0.00% -0.74 0.53% 0.00% -0.53 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP 49.68% 57.89% 8.21 40.11% 53.57% 13.47 41.92% 57.14% 15.22 
PS 37.28% 31.58% -5.70 35.87% 28.57% -7.30 35.49% 21.43% -14.06 
PCP-PEV 3.31% 0.00% -3.31 4.97% 0.00% -4.97 3.27% 0.00% -3.27 
























B.E 6.79% 0.00% -6.79 4.73% 0.00% -4.73 7.20% 0.00% -7.20 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 44.42% 60.00% 15.58 22.46% 14.29% -8.17 17.24% 14.29% -2.96 
PS 35.06% 40.00% 4.94 25.95% 14.29% -11.66 28.08% 14.29% -13.79 
RM n.a n.a n.a 31.57% 71.43% 39.85 35.73% 71.43% 35.69 
PCP-PEV 10.18% 0.00% -10.18 9.74% 0.00% -9.74 7.61% 0.00% -7.61 
Table A12: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Porto. 
County: Póvoa de Varzim 



















B.E 1.68% 0.00% -1.68 n.a n.a n.a 4.78% 0.00% -4.78 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 52.87% 66.67% 13.80 49.60% 85.71% 36.11 51.93% 85.71% 33.78 
PS 31.23% 16.67% -14.56 23.45% 0.00% -23.45 12.70% 0.00% -12.70 
PCP-PEV 3.93% 0.00% -3.93 5.30% 0.00% -5.30 4.12% 0.00% -4.12 
Table A13: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Póvoa de Varzim. 
County: Santo Tirso 
Parties 



















PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 39,94% 25,00% -14,94 36,04% 28,57% -7,47 29,90% 14,29% -15,62 
PS 47.36% 66.67% 19.30 46.42% 64.29% 17.87 54.75% 71.43% 16.68 
PCP-PEV 4.20% 0.00% -4.20 5.88% 0.00% -5.88 4.96% 0.00% -4.96 























B.E n.a n.a n.a 2.34% 0.00% -2.34 n.a n.a n.a 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 53.65% 62.50% 8.85 46.94% 60.00% 13.06 56.37% 80.00% 23.63 
PS 40.85% 37.50% -3.35 38.42% 20.00% -18.42 31.35% 20.00% -11.35 
PCP-PEV 3.11% 0.00% -3.11 4.51% 0.00% -4.51 4.91% 0.00% -4.91 
Table A15: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Trofa. 
County: Valongo 
Parties 



















B.E 3.60% 0.00% -3.60 3.47% 0.00% -3.47 5.29% 0.00% -5.29 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 27.21% 40.00% 12.79 31.42% 25.00% -6.42 24.13% 0.00% -24.13 
PS 31.85% 40.00% 8.15 38.11% 50.00% 11.89 49.82% 75.00% 25.18 
PCP-PEV 6.22% 0.00% -6.22 8.51% 0.00% -8.51 6.01% 0.00% -6.01 
Table A16: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Valongo. 
County: Vila do Conde 
Parties 



















B.E 2.67% 0.00% -2.67 0.99% 0.00% -0.99 1.17% 0.00% -1.17 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP* 29.10% 6.67% -22.43 34.86% 14.29% -20.57 15.49% 4.76% -10.73 
PS 56.34% 80.00% 23.66 43.83% 76.19% 32.36 35.15% 47.62% 12.47 
PCP-PEV 3.64% 0.00% -3.64 5.59% 0.00% -5.59 3.20% 0.00% -3.20 
Table A17: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Vila do Conde. 
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County: Vila Nova de Gaia 
Parties 



















B.E 3.31% 0.00% -3.31 3.38% 0.00% -3.38 5.74% 0.00% -5.74 
PPD/PSD.CDS-PP 46.34% 70.83% 24.49 30.02% 13.33% -16.69 22.77% 0.00% -22.77 
PS 33.84% 20.83% -13.01 41.68% 80.00% 38.32 56.01% 100.00% 43.99 
PCP-PEV 7.20% 0.00% -7.20 9.31% 0.00% -9.31 6.34% 0.00% -6.34 
Table A18: Vote-share, seat-share and partisan bias in 2009, 2013 and 2017, per party, in Vila Nova de Gaia. 
 















Mean 1.02 1.15 0.40 3.89 0.80 1.32 3.73 5.88 1.50 1.44 -0.28 0.95 1.20 













Total of the 
Porto´s 
district 
Mean 0.09 -0.25 -0.47 -0.21 1.59 1.32 
SD 13.21 11.60 12.34 15.46 20.76 14.15 
Table A19: Mean and standard deviation of the partisan bias, by county and in total. 
 
